Asad's Critique of Geertz (worksheet)

Asad “The Construction of Religion as an Anthropological Category"

In this worksheet, we consider Asad's critique of Geertz. The following sections are taken from Asad “The Construction of Religion as an Anthropological Category” in a book edited by Lambek. Lambek observes that Asad challenges not only the idea of religion as a:

So these are Lambek’s words on Asad. I see Asad as having two relevant critiques in relation to what we are learning in the subject Symbols & Society.

1.      The Critique of Symbols

One is the critique of the importance that Geertz places on symbols. To make this critique, Asad points to St Augustine, an early Christian thinker. Augustine thought that strict, harsh discipline was the best way to ensure people walked along the straight path. To make the point, Asad quotes a passage from Brown.:

The point is that Geertz’s formula is "too simple”. The point Asad is making seems to be that discipline, coercion, power, and not symbols, create religious dispositions.

2. The critique of the concept of “religion”

The second critique is more complicated. Many Westerners now take it for granted that religion and politics are separate categories. But if you separate religion from other domains of life (e.g. politics, economics) or thought (e.g. common sense, aesthetic, scientific) you are merely buying into a modern liberal way of looking at the world. Our liberal ancestors in the 1800s gave us the thought world we live in. They created the category of “religion”, this was something they made-up. They made it up, because it suited their interests—they wanted the church out of the way of new categories of life they had created: politics and economics. Now, as a result of their endeavours, we assume that “religion” is something real and out-there. Geertz also assumes this, Asad argues.What Geertz and others fail to realise is that religion is a historical product.

In his words:

The insistence that religion has an autonomous essence – not to be confused with the essence of science, or of politics, or a common sense – invites us to define religion (like any essence) as a transhistorical and transcultural phenomenon. It [is no] accident that this effort of defining religion converges with liberal demand in our time that we kept quite separate from politics, law, and science –  spaces in which varieties of power and reason articulate our distinctly modern life. This definition is it was part of the strategy…of the confinement...of religion.

As you probably realise, Asad is drawing on Foucault’s idea of discourse and power. He sees Geertz as merely restating a dominant discourse; a discourse which has significant implication for power:

My argument is that there cannot be a universal definition of religion, not only because it's constituent elements and relationships are historically specific, but because that definition is itself historical product of discursive processes.

There are further arguments in Asad’s essay. He critiques the distinction between aesthetic, scientific, religious, and common sense modes of thought, arguing, as I recall, that distinguishing scientific from religious thought in the Middle Ages is misleading. He also argues that Geertz’s inattention to the question of power makes Geertz unable to account for historical change. Asad asks, to paraphrase poorly, how can people who are obsessed with, and trapped in, their world of symbols and rituals actually go out there and rebel and revolt? It is clear that revolts and rebellions occur, but Geertz’s theory does not help us understand.

If you’re having trouble understanding all this, it’s probably better you read the article in full. For our purposes, try to focus on the first two critiques.